AutoTableTop Scenario
Colonial Pipeline 2021 Scenario
Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack from May 2021, one of the biggest incidents in history with its impact on the U.S. Everything to help new facilitators learn how to use AutoTableTop.

Summary
The Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack from May 2021 is one of the largest cybersecurity incidents in history in its impact on the United States.
This is available as a Pre-Built Scenario since AutoTableTop™ version 1.0, including both the settings file (available within the Scenario Settings window) and a sample Incident Response Plan (available within the Document Library window). These are meant to be used by a facilitator running an exercise recreating the situation the Colonial Pipeline team faced in May 2021.
The scenario and the sample incident response plan
→ Colonial Pipeline scenario detailed description document ←
On May 7, 2021, the DarkSide hacking group entered Colonial Pipeline through a compromised VPN account with no multifactor authentication, stole about 100 gigabytes of data, and encrypted corporate systems. Colonial halted its 5,500-mile refined-products pipeline, which supplied about 45 percent of East Coast fuel. The shutdown brought shortages, panic buying, a federal emergency declaration, and a ransom payment of about $4.4 million in bitcoin. Operations restarted May 12 and returned to normal May 15.
This Pre-Built Scenario recreates that decision point for a facilitator. It covers the company, a core set of departments (IT and cybersecurity, operations, executive leadership, legal, and communications), participant roles, an IT/OT network with SCADA and at least one VPN, and injects that start with pressure anomalies, a locked control-room screen, and an inaccessible billing system, then escalate to regulators and the press.
The sample Incident Response Plan is a teaching document built from the scenario and the public record. It names an exercise team under publicly reported Colonial leadership and walks detection, isolation, VPN disablement, OT segmentation, the shutdown call, SCADA-first restoration, outside forensics, notifications to DHS, the FBI, and CISA, and regulatory reporting such as an SEC Form 8-K. Upload it with the settings file so actions are judged against a plan. A working room is the CIO, the CISO, and the IT security manager, with legal and operations added when the injects turn to shutdown and disclosure.
The scenario document explains each setting, general and Colonial-specific, before the first inject.
Case study: ten exercises against May 2021
→ Colonial Pipeline case study ←
The ThreatGEN Support Group ran this scenario ten times in AutoTableTop™ version 1.0 and compared the pattern with the public record. Colonial did not participate. The benchmark is the known timeline: shutdown on May 7, notification of the FBI, CISA, the Department of Energy, and DHS, Mandiant engaged, 75 bitcoin paid the same day, restart May 12, normal operations May 15, about 100 gigabytes stolen, and 63.7 bitcoin recovered by the Department of Justice on June 7.
Shared with the real incident:
- Entry through a compromised VPN account
- Corporate IT hit, including billing
- Pipeline operations disrupted
Where the exercises diverged:
- Plan activated immediately, versus days to fully assess and respond
- Partial, controlled shutdown, versus a full shutdown of about five days
- Ransom payment never debated; Colonial paid about $4.4 million
- Mandiant engaged proactively, versus after detection
- Simulated notices to DHS, the FBI, and CISA, versus wider agency involvement
- Public impact stayed thin, versus shortages and panic buying
A representative October 7, 2024 run with the CIO, CISO, and IT security manager scored 85 out of 100.
- Worked: early activation, isolation that kept ransomware on the IT side, SCADA restored first, credentials reissued, multifactor authentication required
- Missed: late identification of the VPN foothold, weak partner and regulator coordination, thin stakeholder communication (five points each)
- Planning estimate about $1.2 million before any ransom ($300,000 internal, $400,000 Mandiant, $200,000 restoration, $300,000 customer communication)
- Techniques in the scenario: valid accounts (T1078), remote services (T1021), data encrypted for impact (T1486)
Recommendations from the ten runs: multifactor authentication on every access path, especially VPN; scheduled audits and penetration tests; a written protocol for DHS, FBI, CISA, customers, and the press; a retest that includes the shutdown call and the 8-K call; and a prior decision on who may discuss payment.
